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I. INTRODUCTION
We are now in the midst of a confused era for federalism doc-
trine. A court of appeals has read the Supreme Court's precedents for
at least as much as they are worth in holding that Congress, in enact-
ing the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, exceeded the power the
Commerce Clause grants it., The Supreme Court itself has been un-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. I would like to thank Peter Byrne, Michael
Gottesman, Steve Goldberg, Vicki Jackson, Mike Seidman, and participants in the Vanderbilt
Law Review Symposium for their comments on a draft of this Article.
1. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
1536 (1994). See also United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), reversed
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able to develop a stable constitutional doctrine about the roles of
Congress and the courts in protecting federalism.
Every time the Supreme Court has wandered into the federal-
ism forest, it has gotten lost. For a while, scholars believed we under-
stood why. Elaborating for modern times a Madisonian theme,
Herbert Wechsler persuaded us that the Constitution's three struc-
tures-national power, federalism, and judicial review-fit together
comfortably.2 Because the interests of states as states were repre-
sented in the national political process, it was unnecessary to deploy
judicial review to protect their interests against normatively unconsti-
tutional assertions of national legislative power.3
Justices Lewis Powell and Sandra Day O'Connor provided
powerful counterarguments to that understanding. Whatever was
true about the original Constitution, they argued, the constitutional
system under which we now live is different. Formal constitutional
amendments had limited the representation of states as states in the
national political process, and extra-constitutional developments,
such as the emergence of a national two-party system, further re-
duced the practical political power of states. Constitutional formalists
might describe the result as an unconstitutional regime, too en-
trenched to be eliminated completely.4 Constitutional revisionists
might describe the present system as the result of informal constitu-
tional amendments5 In either case, those concerned about ensuring
an appropriate distribution of power between nation and states might
want to reexamine the role of judicial review: If the national political
process no longer protects the interests of states to the degree the
Framers thought appropriate, perhaps the courts should assume a
role that they did not have in the initial scheme of things.
and remanded, No. 93-6398, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 19221, 1994 WL 389210 (6th Cir. July 26,
1994) (holding unconstitutional the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2119) (Supp. 1992),
rev'd United States v. Osteen, 30 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1994). These holdings go beyond prior
federalism decisions such as National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), which found statutes unconstitutional because,
though within the authority delegated to Congress by Article I, they nonetheless violated struc-
tural federalist principles.
2. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism, in Herbert Wechsler,
Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 49 (Harvard U., 1961).
3. More precisely, the interests of states as states were well enough represented, so that
efforts to enhance their representation through judicial review were likely to limit national
power in a normatively unconstitutional way. On balance, normative constitutionalism would
then be protected better by abjuring judicial review than by exercising it.
4. See Peter McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. _ (forthcoming Nov.
1994).
5. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (Harvard U., 1991).
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In this Article, I contend that the argument offered by Justices
Powell and O'Connor should be rejected, despite its manifest attrac-
tions. The present confusion is likely to be resolved as it has been in
the past: The Supreme Court will definitely reject the proposition
that the Constitution authorizes it to invalidate national laws on the
ground that they violate principles of federalism.6
My argument has two parts. First, I examine the Supreme
Court's deliberations in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,7 to see how and why the Court overruled its earlier decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery8 asserting its power to invalidate
national laws on federalism grounds. Most of the reasons for overrul-
ing National League of Cities were provided by the Garcia opinion it-
self: Justice Blackmun explained that the Court had found itself un-
able to draw the lines suggested by National League of Cities in a
sensible way. Some other reasons, though, can be found in the inter-
personal dynamics of the Supreme Court, and indicate why federalism
doctrine may have been particularly unstable.9
Second, I examine how similar considerations may undermine
the Court's newest federalism doctrine, as articulated in New York v.
United States.o Of course we cannot know now the interpersonal dy-
namics of the present (and future) Court. But we can make some
guesses about whether its members will be able to use the doctrine to
arrive at sensible results. By examining several recent developments,
I argue that the prospects of developing a doctrine out of New York v.
United States that would yield stable and sensible judicial decisions
limiting national power in the name of federalism are quite bleak.
II. GARcIA INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
We need only a quick look at Garcia's background. In 1976,
almost a decade before Garcia, the Supreme Court in National League
of Cities held that Congress' attempt to force state and local govern-
6. The word definitively here has a special meaning, though: The decision will reject that
proposition until some later Supreme Court decides that Congress has gone too far this time,
and needs to be reined in again.
7. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
8. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
9. My analysis relies on the papers of Justice Wflliam J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood
Marshall, both in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. Justice Brennan's files on
Garcia are in Brennan Papers, Box 666, file 5 ("Brennan Papers) (on file with the Library of
Congress). Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent material on the Court's deliberations in
Garcia are from this file.
10. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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ments to comply with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act violated
principles of federalism., The Court's precise holding was unclear in
1976. Congress went wrong, somehow, because its regulatory effort
impaired the states' "ability 'to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions."12 The Court's opinion could be
read to mean that the function was setting wages for state employees
generally, or that the function was operating basic state institutions.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion offered a balancing test, al-
though he failed to indicate exactly what went into the balance or why
the statute at issue was on balance an unjustifiable intrusion on state
authority."3
The Court struggled with National League of Cities for a dec-
ade, never finding another federal statute unconstitutional on federal-
ism grounds. It upheld federal regulations of strip mining whose aim
was to restore the land to its original contours-a function that might
have seemed quintessentially local, but which somehow came to have
interstate environmental overtones. 4 It also upheld federal energy
policies that forced state agencies to consider specific approaches to
rate-making, pursuant to federally prescribed procedures, and to en-
force other federally prescribed rules."5 And, moving to the employ-
ment area at issue in National League of Cities, it upheld the appli-
cation of federal age discrimination laws to state employees. 6 Even
more closely related to National League of Cities was United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad.7 There the Court up-
held the constitutionality of applying federal collective bargaining
rules to a state-owned commuter railroad. By the early 1980s, it
seemed that, as Chief Justice Warren Burger put it, the National
League of Cities doctrine was "at [a] cross-roads." Was it to be a se-
rious restraint on congressional power? Or, was it to be effectively
abandoned or even formally overruled?
The Supreme Court heard argument in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority on March 19, 1984. Chief Justice
Burger opened the discussion of the case at the Court's next confer-
11. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851.
12. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 and n.29 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. at 845)).
13. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
14. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
15. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
16. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
17. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
18. Conference Notes, in Brennan Papers (cited in note 9).
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ence with a typically rambling statement. He pointed out that federal
funds subsidized seventy-five percent of public mass transit.19 Still,
he said, "transit systems are essentially local... like water."20 He
thought that the federal government "can attack conditions. '21 But,
he said, he did think that the Long Island Railroad case "controls
this."22
Justice William J. Brennan, relying as he usually did on a
typescript statement, said that public mass transit was not a
"'traditional state function' for purposes of the Tenth Amendment."23
He relied on the Long Island Railroad case as well. For him, "history
played a vital role in this inquiry.24 As he saw it, "if the states have
not traditionally performed a particular function, they have, of course,
survived as independent entities without performing that function at
all."25 He therefore found it "difficult to see how federal regulation of
that function can threaten the states' independent existence.
'26
Because mass transit systems had traditionally been privately oper-
ated, public operation was not a traditional state function.
Additionally, the "recent large scale entry of the states into the mass
transit field [was] a joint venture with the federal government, rather
than a matter of purely local concern."27 He also pointed out that the
vast majority of public transit systems "became public after 1966,"
when the federal Fair Labor Standards Act was amended to apply to
them.2
Justices Byron White and Thurgood Marshall endorsed
Brennan's comprehensive statement.29 Justice Harry Blackmun
spoke next. He found it a "tough case" after his separate opinion in
National League of Cities.30 For him, "[m]unicipal mass transit reeks
of localism, like police [and] fire" services.3I Although he believed that
a "good opinion can be written either way," he "c[a]me down on [the]
side that this was local.' 3 2 Justice Powell diplomatically agreed with








27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 3.






Blackmun that a "principled decision" could be written either way,
but also agreed with Blackmun's bottom line.3 '"We're talking here,"
he said, about "moving people to [and] from their work-a service that
it's essential to provide."3 4
Justice John Paul Stevens sounded the Wechslerian theme.
He thought it "anomalous" that cities "With their political powers
should be protected against Congress."3 The issue, for him, was
"[h]ow much should be entrusted to [the] democratic process." 36
Justice O'Connor inverted Stevens' concerns. For her the test was
"whether Congress goes too far. 3 7
When the vote was taken, the Justices divided four-to-four,
with Chief Justice Burger passing.38 A few days later he decided to
vote that it was unconstitutional to apply the Fair Labor Standards
Act to municipal transit systems,39 and assigned the opinion to Justice
Blackmun as the "least persuaded" of that result. Justice Brennan
told his dissenting colleagues that he would do the dissent himself.40
Two months later, on June 11, Justice Blackmun surprised his
colleagues when he circulated a draft opinion coming out against his
conference vote to affirm the constitutionality of applying the Fair
Labor Standards Act to the transit system.41 His cover memorandum
said that he "ha[d] been able to find no principled way in which to af-
firm."42 He rejected the Court's previous reliance on whether a func-
tion had been "traditional" or "historical," and proposed "something
more fundamental ... to eliminate the widespread confusion in the
area."43
Justice Blackmun argued that "the fundamental limitation
that the constitutional scheme imposes ... is one of process rather
than one of result."44 It followed, he said, that "[a]ny additional sub-
stantive restraints.., must find their justification in the procedural








40. Justice Brennan Memorandum to Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens (April 2,
1984), in Brennan Papers (cited in note 9).




44. Justice Blackmun, 2d Draft of Opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority 25 (June 13, 1984), in Brennan Papers (cited in note 9).
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sate for possible failings in the national political process. '45 This led
him to propose a "requirement that Congress not attempt to single out
the States for special burdens or otherwise discriminate against
them."46 Where federal regulations affect private parties as well as
the states, "[t]he constitutional mechanisms for safeguarding the role
of the States are unlikely to be at risk," because "the outcome will re-
flect not only the States' own interests, but the interests of all those
who are similarly situated. In those circumstances, the structural
features of the Constitution designed to protect the States can be
trusted to have served their purpose. ''47 The federal Fair Labor
Standards Act did not single out the states for special regulation, and
was therefore constitutional.
Justice O'Connor called Blackmun's circulation "unexpected."48
The fact that no one appears to have anticipated Blackmun's shift
says something about the state of interpersonal relations on the
Court. When he circulated his draft, Justice Blackmun said that his
new position meant that "the cases should be reassigned"49-although
presumably that meant only that Justice Brennan ought to say im-
mediately that the case was now assigned by him to Justice
Blackmun to affirm-and that "some of you may feel the cases should
go over for reargument. '5o Chief Justice Burger immediately picked
up on the latter suggestion. "[A] 30 page opinion coming out contrary
to the Conference vote on a very important issue," Burger wrote,
"places those who may dissent in a difficult position," with the im-
pending conclusion to the Court's term.51 Justice O'Connor, concerned
that the "summer recess [was] right around the corner," agreed, 52 as
did Justice William Rehnquist.
5 3
Then the other side weighed in. Justice Brennan "s[aw] no ne-




48. Justice O'Connor Memorandum to the Conference (June 11, 1984), in Brennan Papers
(cited in note 9).
49. Justice Blackmun Memorandum to the Conference (June 11, 1984), in Brennan
Papers.
50. Id.
51. Chief Justice Burger Memorandum to Justice Blackmun (June 11, 1984), in Brennan
Papers.
52. Justice O'Connor Memorandum to the Conference (June 11, 1984), in Brennan Papers;
Justice Rehnquist Memorandum to Justice Blackmun (June 11, 1984), in Brennan Papers.
53. Justice Rehnquist Memorandum to Justice Blackmun (June 11, 1984), in Brennan
Papers.




be indicated by my vote in previous cases... I am much taken with
your opinion and could join it if the case is not to be reargued."55 But,
Justice White said, he would prefer not to vote yet if the case was to
be reargued.56 He did say that he "would be inclined to follow [Justice
Blackmun's] lead" on whether the case should be reargued.
57
The most substantial intervention came from Justice Stevens,
and it can be understood only in a somewhat broader context. Justice
Stevens and some of his other relatively liberal colleagues periodically
got upset with Chief Justice Burger's leadership style. Burger was
something of a bumbler, often confused about what had happened at
the Court conference and sometimes inept at the personal relations
needed to smooth over the inevitable tensions that characterize the
operation of a nine-person Court dealing with hard and divisive is-
sues. Burger's colleagues generally put up with the way he operated,
though they never were entirely comfortable with it. Occasionally,
though, they got irritated. Their irritation typically took the form of
attributing confusion not to Burger's ineptitude but to a deeper
Machiavellian strategy designed to push the Court in a more conser-
vative direction.
One such outbreak of irritation was occurring as the Court
considered Garcia. A week and a half after hearing oral argument in
Garcia, the Court heard argument in New Jersey v. T.L.0.
68
Apparently the Court's conservatives had believed that the case would
be a good vehicle for articulating standards for school searches that
would send a signal to school authorities that they could expand their
efforts to control crime and disorder in the schools. At the oral argu-
ment, though, it became clear that the state's lawyers were asking for
something quite different. The state's petition for certiorari had ac-
cepted the state supreme court's standard for conducting school
searches, which was "reasonable suspicion. 59 It sought an exception
from the exclusionary rule for evidence found as a result of school
searches conducted with less than reasonable suspicion. Even the
Court's conservatives were unwilling to go that far. Still, they had to
do something about T.L.O. itself. At first Chief Justice Burger ap-
peared to go along with the suggestion that the Court should dismiss
the writ of certiorari improvidently granted. Others, though, pressed
to have the case re-argued, with the parties invited to address the
55. Justice White Memorandum to Justice Blackmun (June 13, 1984), in Brennan Papers.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 468 U.S. 1214 (1984).
59. Id. at 1214-15.
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question of whether the search in T.L.O. violated the "reasonable
suspicion" standard.
Once the decision to reargue was made, Justice Stevens circu-
lated a draft dissent from the reargument order. The Chief Justice
sent Stevens a note indicating his astonishment that Stevens was
proposing to publish a dissent from what was at that point an interim
order.60 Stevens was adamant, even a bit snippy. He told the Chief
Justice, 'Your first vote. . . was to dismiss the writ as improvidently
granted. It baffles me that you can consider a case worth either no
argument or two arguments."61 Stevens' dissent from the order di-
recting reargument in T.L.O. said that the majority, "[e]vidently un-
able or unwilling to decide the question presented by the parties," was
"[v]olunteering unwanted advice" in asking the parties to address an
issue they had "no desire to seek reversal" on.
62
The question of what to do with T.L.O. was still in the air as
Stevens considered the suggestion that Garcia be reargued. He wrote
the Chief Justice a pointed letter saying that the conference ought to
discuss the standards to be applied to motions for reargument.63
Stevens described "four alternative grounds for reargument.64 He
ruled out the possibility of a change in membership over the summer
as a permissible ground for reargument,65 and similarly indicated that
reargument would not be proper simply because one Justice was "not
certain as to his vote ... unless the vote became critical to the dispo-
sition.66 Reargument would be proper, he suggested, "[i]f five justices
are unable to agree on the proper disposition of a case before the end
of June."17
His sharpest comments were directed at the situation posed by
Garcia, where "the circulation of the majority opinion comes so late
that there is not adequate time in which to prepare a dissent."68 Here
he mentioned some recent experiences. In one case, Stevens said, he
did not circulate his proposed majority opinion until June 6; Justice
Rehnquist circulated a dissent on June 20 "and on the following day
60. Chief Justice Burger Memorandum to Justice Stevens (July 2, 1984), in Marshall
Papers, Box 361, file 5 (hereinafter Marshall Papers) (on file with the Library of Congress).
61. Justice Stevens Memorandum to Chief Justice Burger (July 3, 1984), in Marshall
Papers.
62. 468 U.S. 1214, 1215 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Justice Stevens Memorandum to Chief Justice Burger 1 (June 12, 1984), in Brennan
Papers (cited in note 9).
64. Id. at 1-3.
65. Id. at 2-3.
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. atl.
68. Id. at 1-2.
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you [the Chief Justice] changed your vote."69 A week later Rehnquist
circulated a draft opinion for the Court, and Stevens converted his
opinion into a dissent.70 In 1976, Stevens pointed out, he had circu-
lated a proposed majority opinion on June 18, Justice White circu-
lated a dissent on June 21, the Chief Justice changed his vote on June
25, and White converted his opinion into a majority opinion by June
28.71 Stevens drove the point home: "In the case under discussion
now, I find it difficult to believe that the four Justices who have sup-
ported the motion to reargue do not have the capacity to prepare a
dissent in the time which remains this month. 7 2 He did not have to
say so, but Justice Blackmun's June 11 circulation was two weeks
earlier than the Chief Justice's, earlier vote switches, which Justice
Stevens had managed to deal with.
Stevens' letter apparently stiffened Blackmun's resolve, and he
voted against reargument for Garcia. To diffuse the tensions, though,
Justice White went along with the reargument order. Justices Powell
and O'Connor drafted an order requesting that the parties address
the question of whether "the principles of the Tenth Amendment as
set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery ... should be reconsid-
ered. 73 Justice Blackmun, saying that having voted against reargu-
ment he lacked "standing to suggest changes in the proposed form of
order," nonetheless "venture[d] to say. . . that if the question is to be
presented, National League of Cities just might end up being over-
ruled. In the opinion I prepared this Term, and as to which some took
umbrage," he pointed out, "it was not overruled. 74
By the time of reargument, it was all over but the writing. The
discussion at the Court's conference was cursory.75 The Chief Justice
said only that "[m]ass transit cannot be subject to federal control.' 6
Justice Powell tried out a new standard: "whether [a subject was] es-
sentially [a] matter of local or national concern."77 He did not think
the federal interest in Garcia was "that great. 78 Justice O'Connor




73. Justice Powell Memorandum to the Conference (July 3, 1984), in Brennan Papers
(cited in note 9).
74. Justice Blackmun Memorandum to Justice Powell (July 3, 1984), in Brennan Papers.
75. See docket sheet on reargument, in Brennan Papers. Justice Brennan's notes on the







called Garcia "a watershed case." 9 The Framers, she said, "envisaged
a system of state [and] federal sovereignty," and the "pay of state
employees is for states."80
Justice Brennan indicated that he was ready to go along with
the analysis Blackmun had offered the first time around.8' "It is a
splendid piece of scholarship," he said, "and it properly emphasizes
that the federalism restraints on Congress' Commerce Clause power
lie primarily in the political process.8 2 He did add, though, that "if
there is sentiment for expressly overruling National League of Cities, I
would join in such a disposition without hesitation."83 He suggested
that overruling National League of Cities might, "in fact, be required"
by Justice Blackmun's analysis. 84 Justices White and Marshall en-
dorsed overruling National League of Cities.5 Justice Blackmun said
merely that the oral arguments had been "disappointing. 88 Finally,
Justice Stevens, perhaps concerned about tying down Justice
Blackmun's vote to overrule National League of Cities, said explicitly
that "[b]alancing here is for Congress as [Justice Brennan] arg[ues].
Indeed," he continued, this was "a classic case where it's wrong for
[the] judiciary to intervene. '8
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Garcia did overrule National
League of Cities. Its criticisms of the unworkability of the National
League of Cities approach tracked what he had written earlier. The
opinion articulated somewhat more clearly than the first version the
Wechslerian argument that Justice Stevens had been pressing. As
many have observed, though, probably the most notable aspects of
Garcia are the comments by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.
Although a central focus of Justice Blackmun's opinion was the inabil-
ity of the Court to design a workable constitutional doctrine limiting
national power in the name of federalism, Justice Rehnquist refrained
from discussing "the fine points of a principle that will, I am confi-
dent, in time again command the support of a majority of the Court. '88
Justice O'Connor indicated that she "share[d] Justice Rehnquist's be-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Brennan Statement (on reargument), in Brennan Papers (cited in note 9).
82. Id. (emphasis in original).
83. Id. (emphasis in original).
84. Id.
85. Reargument Notes, in Brennan Papers (cited in note 9).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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lief that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional re-
sponsibility. 89
These express promises to disregard stare decisis issues oc-
curred, I believe, because of the internal manueverings that led to the
Garcia opinion. The dissenters were annoyed at Justice Blackmun
who, as they saw it, had "sandbagged" them by voting one way and
circulating a draft opinion coming out the other way, all without no-
tice to them; their decision to treat Garcia as a precedent without
weight resulted from that annoyance. And Justice Blackmun in turn
was annoyed at the dissenters who, as he saw it, failed to appreciate
his honest reconsideration of his position as he tried to work on an
opinion; his decision to overrule rather than distinguish National
League of Cities resulted from that annoyance.
III. TRYING AGAIN
In 1991, Justice O'Connor revived the federalism debate. An
extended essay on the constitutional bases of federalism served to
justify a stringent "clear statement" rule of statutory interpretation in
Gregory v. Ashcroft.90 By the next Term, Justice O'Connor was in a
position to carry through on her promise to revisit the constitutional
question. New York v. United States9l did not quite overrule Garcia.
92
Rather, it tried once again to articulate a judicially enforceable limita-
tion on congressional power to regulate the activities of state govern-
ments. In the remainder of this essay, I explore whether the new
formulation is likely to founder on the same difficulties that attended
the National League of Cities formulation.
Judges attempting to develop judicially enforceable limitations
on congressional power have to solve two problems. First they must
explain why such limitations ought to be devised, and second they
must design limitations that courts actually can enforce. The dissents
in Garcia did a decent job in addressing the first question, and-as
dissents-properly put aside the second. Justice O'Connor got a ma-
jority to accept her earlier analysis of the first problem. The issue I
89. Id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
91. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
92. For the most substantial discussions, see generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 Va. L. Rev. 633 (1993); Richard E. Levy, New York v. United
States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the
Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 493 (1993); and Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field
Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957 (1993).
1634 [Vol. 47:1623
NATL LEAGUE OVERRULED
take up is whether she solved the second one. That is, assuming for
now that federalism is a desirable way to organize a government and
that embedding a commitment to federalism in a constitution is a
good idea, will courts be able to enforce such a constitutional com-
mitment through a judicially administrable doctrine?
The bulk of New York v. United States is an exposition of the
proposition that federalism is a principle embedded in our constitu-
tional structure. Why, though, is that principle to be enforced by the
courts? Perhaps, as Justice Powell suggested in Garcia, the answer is
that another principle of our constitutional structure is that courts
stand ready to enforce all constitutional principles93 That proposi-
tion, however, is inconsistent with, among other things, the political
questions doctrine, which identifies constitutional principles the en-
forcement of which the courts leave to the other branches.
Perhaps the answer lies in a proper Wechslerian analysis.
That is, it may be true, as Wechsler argued, that federalism principles
need not be enforced by the courts as long as the interests of the
states as states are adequately represented in the national political
process. But, contrary to Wechsler, it may not be true today that
those interests are represented adequately.94 And, judicial review is
designed to deal with precisely those situations in which the interests
constitutional principles are designed to protect are not adequately
represented in the political process.95 Preserving state competence in
the face of centralizing legal doctrine and the obvious failure of the
structural guarantees on which Wechsler relied leads recurrently to a
search for informal means by which state interests are protected.96
93. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that "[o]ne can hardly
imagine this Court saying that because Congress is composed of individuals, individual rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position
adopted today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an essential part
of the Bill of Rights").
94. The reasons one might have for rejecting the Wechslerian position may be inconsistent
with some of the reasons that Justice O'Connor offered to defend the doctrinal formulation she
suggested in New York v. United States. See text accompanying note 91.
95. For the classic modem statement of this general theory of judicial review, see
generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard U.,
1980). Note that this theory can account for the political questions doctrine if one believes that
the doctrine is properly invoked only in cases where the political process is adequate to protect
the relevant interests, as it may be, for example, in connection with impeachments. See Nixon
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (holding that Senate has sole discretion to choose
impeachment procedures).




Those informal means, however, are not themselves embedded in the
Constitution and are always vulnerable to drift and change.97
A. General Considerations
Suppose, then, that we are convinced that the courts must be
available to enforce federalism principles against congressional over-
reaching. Then the second problem must be addressed. What pre-
cisely are the principles the courts are to enforce?
1. Functionalist Tests
Adopting terms familiar from discussions of separation of pow-
ers, where similar problems arise, we might distinguish between
functional and formalist versions of federalism principles.98 Justice
Blackmun's support for a balancing test in National League of Cities,
and the informal comments during the Court's deliberations over
Garcia that the question was whether Congress had "gone too far,"
are examples of functional tests.
These proposals indicate almost transparently the problems
with functional tests. A balancing test must assess the relative im-
portance of the federal interest that Congress sought to advance and
the state interest its action affected. But how are the courts to de-
termine just how important a federal interest is? Justice Powell's
comment after the reargument in Garcia, that he did not think that
the federal interest was "that great," illustrates the problem. Was the
federal interest enforcing minimum wage standards on public em-
ployers, or on employers generally? And, even if it was the more lim-
ited interest, on what basis could Justice Powell defend his assertion
that the federal interest was not "that great"?
Balancing tests are familiar from many contexts, including
First Amendment law.99 Their very familiarity may be misleading,
though. In most contexts, balancing tests are invoked against actions
of governments at every level. A balancing test for federalism is dif-
ferent, however, because it is invoked only against Congress. State
97. Consider, for example, the various mutations the national party system has
undergone, with their potential impact on the ability of party structures to protect the interests
of states.
98. The terms are most familiar from their use in Peter L. Strauss, Formal and
Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell
L. Rev. 488 (1987).
99. For a general discussion, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 Yale L. J. 943 (1987).
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and local governments have widely varying agendas, and some gov-
ernment somewhere is likely to try almost anything. As a result,
some ill-considered laws and regulations may slip through the politi-
cal process.
Congress, in contrast, is so busy that it can do only a few, quite
important things. Wechsler's analysis may be inadequate to justify a
complete regime of judicial abstention from federalism cases, but no
one denies that states as states have some substantial political influ-
ence on the national political process. If these practical political con-
siderations can be taken into account, as a functionalist analysis
would suggest, they undermine the case for judicial balancing. The
practical political constraints, coupled with burdens on Congress'
time, make it seem quite unlikely that Congress would adversely af-
fect the interests of states without a pretty good reason for doing so.
Modern criticisms of unfunded mandates reject this argument.
According to critics, Congress is attracted to unfunded man-
dates-programs that impose substantial costs on the operation of
state governments without imposing federal taxes to cover those
costs-because they allow Congress to get the political benefit of im-
posing a regulation without having to bear the political cost of raising
taxes. If voters are fully informed and rational, however, it is quite
unclear how this can happen.100 Voters elect members of Congress
and state legislators, and they pay taxes to the national and state
governments. It ought not matter to any voter which of the people he
or she elects actually decides to create a program that takes money
from the voter's pocket, nor should it matter to such a voter what the
address on the envelope is in which the relevant tax payment is in-
cluded. If voters are informed and rational, that is, enacting an un-
funded mandate garners members of Congress no immunity from
voter concern about increased taxes.
Perhaps, though, voters are not fully informed. If this is the
case, however, we ought to wonder why the misinformation system-
atically favors the national government against the state. That is, we
would need to know how often voters mistakenly believe that pro-
grams they favor, which Congress has enacted, were "actually"
adopted by the state legislature. True, state legislatures may lose po-
litical points when Congress commands them to enforce an unpopular
federal regulatory program, but they may gain political points when
100. For an effort to explain unfunded mandates along these lines (which in my view re-
quires quite strong assumptions about voter ignorance), see generally Edward A. Zelinsky,
Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public
Interest, and Public Services, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1355 (1993).
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Congress commands them to enact a popular one. Moreover, if
Congress adopts the strategy of having the national government di-
rectly administer all the popular programs while passing the unpopu-
lar ones off on the states, state officials will have an easier time of
pinning responsibility where it lies, on the national government.
Coupled with judges' unease about their capacity to determine
reliably whether a federal interest really does outweigh the adverse
impact on states, the foregoing considerations are likely to lead courts
routinely to uphold federal laws when they balance the relevant in-
terests. That is what happens in separation-of-powers cases, and it is
what happened under the regime established by National League of
Cities, where Justice Blackmun, a supporter of balancing, provided
the fifth vote to uphold every law that the Court considered after
National League of Cities.
2. Formalist Tests
a. Nondiscrimination
What might be some formalist alternatives? Consider first the
regime under National League of Cities as it would have been modi-
fied by Justice Blackmun's initial proposal in Garcia that Congress
may not single states out for discriminatory treatment. This ap-
proach raises a host of problems. Under this regime, Congress could
regulate states if they fell into a larger class that included some indi-
viduals, but it could not regulate the states alone. (See Diagram A.)
Diagram A
Congress -* -- Individuals + Permitted
statesI
Congress - -* States only Not Permitted
Justice Blackmun's draft opinion in Garcia, as well as the
published final version, pointed out one problem with this regime.
States engage in many activities that private individuals do not en-
gage in. Traditionally those activities were called "governmental" to
distinguish them from the "proprietary" activities that individuals as
well as governments engaged in. Yet, experience in cases involving
intergovernmental tax immunities had shown that courts cannot reli-
ably administer a line distinguishing between governmental and pro-
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prietary activities.' 01 Justice Blackmun could not have been proposing
a rule that would have treated as "discriminatory" a regulation that
applied only to the states because only they engaged in the regulated
activities.
His proposal might be salvaged by pointing out that the tradi-
tional "governmental/proprietary" distinction actually did not distin-
guish between activities that only governments engaged in and those
that both governments and individuals did. Modern state action cases
serve as a relevant analogy here. These cases hold that the
Constitution imposes obligations on governments only with respect to
functions that are "exclusively" governmental.102 That category has
proven to be nearly empty, however, because in the modern United
States, with widespread practices of "contracting out" traditional gov-
ernment functions, almost no government function is performed only
by governments. 10 3 Thus, although Justice Blackmun's proposal
might be augmented by the analogy to state action cases to avoid his
own criticisms of the "governmental/proprietary" distinction, it would
then actually impose no limits on Congress' power.
A further difficulty arises from the preemption doctrine, which,
roughly stated, gives Congress free reign to displace state authority to
regulate some private activity when the private activity affects inter-
state commerce. Consider an express preemption provision in its
typical form, stating that "no State may impose a requirement" incon-
sistent with prescribed federal standards. Such a provision "singles
the states out" for special treatment. It bars them from doing some-
thing-imposing a regulatory requirement-that no private entity is
barred from doing (because, of course, no private entity has the legal
capacity to impose such requirements). Here, then, is a prototypically
governmental function that, one assumes, Justice Blackmun could not
have meant to immunize from federal regulation.04
101. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 540-42.
102. See, for example, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974).
103. But see Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that
exercising the right to peremptory challenges is exclusive state fimction).
104. Indeed, a footnote in Justice Blackmun's draft specifically preserved the stronger
implication of preemption doctrine that, as he put it:
[C]ongress' undisputed authority to pre-empt state regulation of private activities en-
tails the additional authority to forgo pre-emption and to require instead that States
consider specified federal interests in regulating the same conduct, see FERC v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763-768 and rm. 29-30 (1982), even though the exercise of the
latter authority requires Congress to address its commands to the States alone.




"Discrimination," then, is unlikely to be a judicially enforceable
standard for picking out impermissible federal action. The problem of
preemption poses difficulties as well for Justice O'Connor's formula-
tion in New York v. United States. Her concluding formulation is de-
ceptively simple: '"The Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. ''105
Earlier, Justice O'Connor provided a somewhat more elaborate ver-
sion: Congress may neither 'commandeer' state governments into
the service of federal regulatory purposes," nor may it "present a
simple command to state governments to implement legislation en-
acted by Congress."106 What is crucial, it would seem, is that states
are being called on to do something to their citizens-in New York v.
United States, to their producers of low-grade nuclear wastes. (See
Diagram B.) Congress could, however, preempt state regulations by
itself prescribing federal regulations.
Diagram B
Congress -+ Individuals Permitted
Congress -. States Permitted
Congress -. States -+ Individuals Not Permitted
Justice O'Connor offered two kinds of reasons for this result.
One, which she labelled "formalistic,"107 was that this simply was the
regime established by the Constitution. Others have pointed out that
the historical account Justice O'Connor offered to defend the formalis-
tic analysis is plainly inaccurate. 08 On her account, the Framers re-
placed the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution because
they believed that the Articles were a failure. The Articles were a
failure, the Framers believed, because they allowed Congress to im-
pose obligations only on the states, and did not allow it to impose ob-
ligations directly on individuals. They therefore created a constitu-
tion granting power to Congress to regulate individuals directly, with-
out the states as intermediaries. All of this account is true enough,
but it fails to show that the Framers thought the Articles of
105. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2435.
106. Id. at 2428.
107. Id. at 2434.
108. See, for example, Powell, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 652 (cited in note 92).
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Confederation were a failure because they did allow Congress to im-
pose obligations on states. For all Justice O'Connor's history estab-
lishes, the Framers wanted to supplement national power to regulate
the states directly with national power to regulate individuals, not to
supplant national power to regulate the states.10 9
A formalist might note another difficulty with Justice
O'Connor's formalist defense of her doctrine. She permits preemp-
tion, but preemption is a "command" to the states that they regulate
an area in a specified way-by permitting only the regime that
Congress prescribes. So, for example, a state legislature responding
to citizen demand might enact a statute imposing special liabilities on
employers who manipulate their pension and benefits plans to their
workers' detriment. If Congress preempts the power to regulate pen-
sion plans, it thereby directs state courts to ignore what the state's
citizens desire.
The problem is quite general, but appears in its starkest form
in "field" preemption. Field preemption occurs when Congress has to-
tally occupied a field. It has its special bite when Congress, having
totally occupied a field, does not prescribe a regulation of some subject
within that field. The result is that a regime of complete private free-
dom from regulation prevails with respect to that subject: Congress
has not prescribed a rule, and the states may not do so because the
field has been totally occupied by Congress. Field preemption, that is,
commands the states to put up with a regime of complete private
freedom from regulation-to "implement" the federal regime of non-
regulation by barring its courts from enforcing otherwise applicable
tort or contract law, for example.1"0 In this way state governments
109. Prakash, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, labors to show that the Framers did not intend to
supplement national power to act on states, but to supplant it. According to Prakash, the
Framers believed that the experience under the Confederation had shown that attempting to
exercise national power by coercing state governments was "futile, unjust, and potentially
explosive," which led "the Founding Generation [to] renounc[e] the concept." Id. at 1975. All
Prakash's evidence shows, however, is that the Framers believed it to be generally unwise to
attempt to implement national policy by coercing state legislatures, not that they "renounced"
their ability to do so if circumstances might persuade Congress that it would be efficacious, fair,
and acceptable to the people of the states subject to coercion.
110. It might be thought that field preemption differs from directing a state to regulate
because the latter requires the states to spend money (albeit perhaps not much money), while
field preemption does not. However, Prakash stated:
Of course, the congressional ability to commandeer state executives does help Congress
to tap into state treasuries as well. To the extent that state officers are burdened with
federal duties, they neglect state responsibilities, thus necessitating the state legisla-
tures to hire more executives. This indirect commandeering of state funds is a far cry
from the ability to requisition state legislatures.
79 Va. L. Rev. at 2036 (emphasis added).
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must "respond to the commands of Congress rather than the dictates
of their voters.""'
In addition to her formalistic defense of the "no commanding or
commandeering" rule, Justice O'Connor offered a functional defense.
She began that defense by pointing out that Congress can "encourage
a State to regulate in a particular way" and may "hold out incentives.
. . as a method of influencing a State's policy choices.112 She contin-
ued that offering grants to states on the condition that they regulate
in a prescribed manner was permitted, as was giving the states a
choice between regulating "according to federal standards or having
state law pre-empted by federal regulation." 3 Either of these meth-
ods allowed "state officials [to] remain accountable to the people"" 4 by
declining conditional grants when their constituents disagree with the
conditions, or by insisting that state enforcement activities be di-
rected to the issues local constituents care more about. If Congress
can compel states to regulate, Justice O'Connor argued, "the account-
ability of both state and federal officials is diminished.""' 5 Congress
can preempt state law, "but in such a case it is the Federal
Government that makes the decision in full view of the public, and it
will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision
turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.116 She continued: 'But
where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision." 7
This passage seems attractively realistic, but it is attended by
all the problems of functionalism. First, how does Justice O'Connor
know that political responsibility will be diffused as she says?
Why it is "a far cry" is obscure. Even more important, emphasizing only the cost of adminis-
tering a regulatory scheme treats as relevant only the costs state residents bear through their
taxes and not the costs they bear from the unregulated activity. If, however, the analysis of
commandeering ultimately rests on a distinction between the costs of government "action" and
the absence of costs associated with government "inaction," it relies on another formalism, the
extensive criticisms of which I need not recount here. See, for example, Symposium, The
Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1289 (1982).
111. Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism." Finding a Formula for the Future,
47 Vand. L. Rev. 1561, 1569 (1994). For a discussion of the possible distinctions between
national commands to state courts and national commands to state legislatures, see Prakash, 79
Va. L. Rev. at 2007-32.
112. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2423.







Consider again field preemption. An outraged public may say to its
state officials, 'Why are you letting these people get away with that
sort of thing?" The state officials reply, "We would like to regulate
their activities, but the federal government won't let us." According to
Justice O'Connor's analysis, that reply is sufficient to place responsi-
bility where it ought to be. Now consider a federal program requiring
state officials to regulate in a locally unpopular way. Why could the
state officials not reply to the outraged public, "We would like to
regulate-or not regulate-as you want, but the federal government is
forcing us to do this' If the analogous reply is sufficient to locate po-
litical responsibility in the field preemption context, why is this one
not sufficient in the regulatory context?
Second, Justice O'Connor's political analysis is conditional.
Political responsibility "may" be diffused; state officials "may" suffer
public disapproval. But, of course, that they "may" suffer disapproval
means that they may not. What warrant is there for Justice
O'Connor to embed her analysis of contemporary politics in the
Constitution?
In Justice O'Connor's defense, one might reply that a program
with a national majority behind it might not have local majorities
everywhere in the country. What is nationally popular might be lo-
cally unpopular, and officials in states where the program is unpopu-
lar will suffer the political consequences with which she is concerned.
If the program is locally popular, state officials would have adopted it
on their own.
Again, though, the constitutional response to this argument is,
not just how we can tell whether a nationally popular program is lo-
cally unpopular,118 but why judges are the ones to make that assess-
ment. Perhaps a majority actually cannot get its way in some states
because of peculiar local circumstances, like the dominating role of a
local political machine. 'The people" of those states would be happy
to have the program, and will praise their officials when the officials
are commanded to do the right thing. More important, though, why
should the local unpopularity of a program prevail over its national
popularity? Justice O'Connor's analysis overlooks the fact that demo-
cratic federalism means that people rule themselves through two gov-
ernments. As the Civil Rights Act of 1964 showed, programs that are
popular with national majorities acting within the spheres of author-
118. For an argument that we cannot take the fact that state officials decide to litigate to
challenge a program on federalism grounds as an indication that the program is locally unpopu-
lar, see Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to
Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 Urban Lawyer 301 (1988).
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ity they have given the national government ought to prevail in the
face of local unpopularity--or, at least, that this idea is as defensible
a formalistic conception of our federalism as the one Justice O'Connor
offered.
Finally, Justice O'Connor's analysis has an internal tension
that should be noted. She rejects the Wechslerian argument on for-
malist grounds: The structures of the constitutional system no longer
provide adequate representation of the states as states in the national
political process. This failure justifies a judicial role even in the face
of credible evidence that the actual operations of the national gov-
ernment include representation of state interests as significant as oc-
curred before, for example, the adoption of direct election of Senators
in 1913. Why might Justice O'Connor adopt this formalist defense of
a judicial role? One possibility is that she simply does not believe the
"realistic" political argument about how well states do in national
politics. If this is true, however, we might ask her to provide an al-
ternative realistic account rather than a formalist one. On the other
hand, perhaps Justice O'Connor believes that the kind of realistic
political analysis a modernized Wechslerian argument requires is in-
appropriate for judges. Then, however, we might ask her to explain
why she put forth her functional defense of the rule against com-
manding or commandeering.
c. State autonomy
Professor Merritt argues that states require some immunity
from national commands if they are to be autonomous governing
authorities, and that state autonomy is desirable because it serves the
valuable functions of checking national power, diversifying the par-
ticipants in government, providing people with choices among gov-
ernment policies, and serving as laboratories for experimentation.119
She acknowledges that Congress has complete authority to displace
the choices state governments make through direct exercise of its
power to regulate and preempt conflicting state laws. But, she ar-
gues, Congress should be forced to make an all-or-nothing choice
when it regulates.120 Otherwise Congress will show state residents
that their government deserves no respect.
119. See Merritt, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1571-74 (cited in note 111).
120. Congress' power to condition spending on compliance with federal demands differs
from direct regulation of states, in Professor Merritt's view, because the states' bargaining
position against the national government is strengthened when the states have the absolute
power to refuse the conditions. Id. at 1572.
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One might fairly wonder, though, about the appeal of protect-
ing state autonomy as a purely formal matter. The respect state resi-
dents give "their" government surely depends far more on what hap-
pens inside the state capital building than on where the building is lo-
cated. 121 Yet, if Congress has full power to preempt state-imposed
regulations, the states can do what is needed to gain that respect only
at the sufferance of Congress.
I have argued that the rule adopted in New York v. United
States is not easily defended either formally or functionally. Is it,
though, a rule that courts can administer?
B. Doctrinal Tensions After New York v. United States
To see whether a rule can be administered, we need to consider
the occasions on which it is likely to be invoked. What doctrinal lines
might lower courts and the Supreme Court follow in the aftermath of
New York v. United States?
1. Pure Federalism Limits
Some lower courts have already interpreted New York v.
United States to indicate greater receptivity on the Supreme Court to
classical federalism arguments to the effect that Congress simply
lacks the power to regulate certain subjects.122 As Professor Merritt
notes, these decisions emphasize the language in New York v. United
States that justifies its rule with some combination of the specific
terms of Congress' enumerated powers and the language of the Tenth
Amendment.123
2. Distinguishing Among Congress' Powers
Existing federalism jurisprudence suggests that some courts
will be tempted to distinguish among Congress' powers. The fact that
New York v. United States is a "Commerce Clause" case might lead
courts to consider whether the same federalism limits apply when
121. Compare with Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (denying Congress power to limit
state's ability to locate state capital where it chooses).
122. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536
(1994); United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd, United States v.
Osteen, 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994).




Congress acts pursuant to its power to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments, 124 or pursuant to some other power.
For example, Congress prefaced the National Voter
Registration Act of 1993, the so called "Motor Voter" bill,125 with find-
ings that "discriminatory and unfair registration laws and procedures
can have a direct and damaging effect on voter participation in elec-
tions for Federal office and disproportionately harm voter participa-
tion by various groups, including racial minorities."126 This finding
appears to invoke Congress' powers to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments,127 but its limitation to "Federal office"
suggests an attempt to invoke Congress' power to prescribe rules for
the 'Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives."128
Among its other provisions, the Act requires states to establish
procedures to register voters at state public assistance agencies,
which must make a number of "services" available to registrants, in-
cluding "assistance . .. in completing voter registration application
forms." 29 This requirement seems to demand that states allocate
their workers' time in ways that might differ from the states' own
preferences: Instead of spending all of their time implementing state
policies about public assistance, the workers must spend some time
doing what the federal government requires.
Perhaps the "motor voter" statute is unconstitutional under
New York v. United States. Yet, the statute seems different from the
relatively minor provision held unconstitutional there. At the least, it
seems to advance interests that go to the core of the democratic sys-
tem of which federalism is only a part. So, perhaps the courts will say
that federalism concerns have a different bite when Congress acts to
enforce the Reconstruction amendments. That determination, how-
ever, would be difficult to reconcile with Justice O'Connor's formalism
in New York v. United States and would, again, suggest that federal-
ism concerns dictate that courts use a functional balancing test.
124. Compare EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983) (suggesting such a
distinction under the regime of National League of Cities).
125. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77, codified at
42 U.S.CAL. §§ 1973gg et seq. (West, 1994).
126. National Voter Registration Act § 2(a)(3), 107 Stat. at 77, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §
1973gg (a)(3).
127. It invokes the Fifteenth Amendment through the invocation of "racial minorities" and
the Fourteenth Amendment through the implicit reference to others of the "various groups."
128. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 4.
129. National Voter Registration Act § 7(a)(4)(A)(ii), 107 Stat. at 80.
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The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 3o raises a pair of related is-
sues. Some unpublished district court opinions have held the Act un-
constitutional. 131 The Act defimes three classes of gambling activity,
and requires states to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes that
want to establish the third, most regulable form of gambling on their
land.3 2 The courts holding the statute unconstitutional say that
Congress has, once again, commanded the states to do some-
thing-negotiate in good faith. Those holding it constitutional say
that the states simply have to negotiate, but need not agree to any-
thing. Yet, an obligation to negotiate in good faith imposes limits on
what the states can do, as everyone familiar with the labor law duty
to negotiate in good faith knows. Again, New York v. United States
does not offer much guidance on whether the Act unconstitutionally
"commands" or permissibly regulates the states.
Perhaps the rule of New York v. United States is inapplicable
because Congress acted under its power to regulate commerce "With
the Indian Tribes." Like the power to regulate foreign commerce, the
power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes is ordinarily thought
to be "greater" than the power to regulate interstate commerce. 33
Interestingly, one court of appeals has held that Congress lacked
power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity, indicating that in its view Congress'
power here was less than its power under the Interstate Commerce
Clause.134 This reasoning would suggest that the Act's negotiating re-
quirement might still fall.
3. Distinguishing Between Commandeering the Legislature and
Commandeering the Executive and the Judiciary
In an important article, Saikrishna Prakash argues that New
York v. United States was correctly decided because the Constitution
130. 25 U.S.C-.A §§ 2701 et seq. (West, Supp. 1994).
131. See, for example, Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. State, 834 F. Supp. 1341, 1345-46
(W.D.Okla., 1992), for a discussion of all the decided cases. See also William T. Bisset, Tribal-
Stake Gaming Compacts: The Constitutionality of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21
Hastings L. Q. 71 (1993).
132. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
133. See, for example, John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 130
(West, 4th ed. 1991) (stating that "even during periods when the justices were debating whether
to significantly restrict the congressional power to regulate intrastate activities under the
commerce power, there was no serious advocacy of restrictions on the federal power in these
other areas').
134. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. petition filed,
No. 94-35 (July 1, 1994).
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does erect a barrier to congressional commandeering of state legisla-
tive processes, but that it was wrong to intimate that the same barrier
exists when Congress forces state administrative or judicial actors to
comply with its commands. 135 After all, Testa v. Katt5 6 shows that
Congress can force state courts to entertain cases that they otherwise
would decline to decide.1 7 Prakash demonstrates that the Framers
expected Congress to rely on state executives to administer federal
law as well.
This distinction might allow courts to uphold the '2otor Voter"
bill, which imposes obligations not on state legislatures but on state
administrators.'1  Consider, though, the Forest Resources
Conservation and Shortage Relief Act,139 some provisions of which the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional.140 The
Act regulates the export of timber from public lands. For present
purposes, the complex substantive provisions of the statute can be
simplified: The statute prohibits all exports of timber from state-
owned public lands, and requires "the Governor of each State" to issue
regulations implementing the export prohibition. 4,' The ban costs
Washington State approximately $50 million per year in lost profits
from overseas sales. 42 Emphasizing the word "shall" in the statute,
the Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional provisions that "[e]ach State
shall determine the species, grade, and geographic origin of
unprocessed timber . . . and shall administer such prohibitions
consistent with the intent" of the statute, and that the governors
"shall... issue regulations to carry out [the statute's purposes and]
shall enter into formal consultation . . . with appropriate State
officials."143 The regulations would be designed to allow the states to
135. See generally Prakash, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957 (cited in note 92).
136. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
137. Prakash offers two interpretations of Testa, which he apparently believes to be identi-
cal. According to one, Testa articulates "a nondiscrimination principle: Do not discriminate
against federal law or federal cases." Prakash, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 2011-12 (cited in note 92). His
next sentence purports to restate the principle: "if you discriminate against federal cases, you
are not treating federal law as though it were the law of your state." Id. at 2012. The state
courts in Testa did not, however, discriminate against federal claims alone. They refused to
enforce the treble damages provision of federal law pursuant to their general rule against en-
forcing the penal law of another government; when applied to penal laws of other states, the
Court assumed, that rule does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
138. But see Printz v. United States, 62 U.S.L.W. 2725 (D. Mont., May 16, 1994) (holding
unconstitutional provision of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that requires local law
enforcement officials to conduct background checks of handgun buyers).
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 620 et seq. (Supp. 1992).
140. See Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 947 (9th Cir. 1993).
141. 16 U.S.C. § 620c(d)(3)(A).
142. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d at 941.
143. Id. at 947 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 620c(d)(2) & (d)(3)(A) (Supp. 1992)).
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sell timber domestically, and presumably would have to work out
ways of ensuring that timber would not leak into the international
market. According to the Ninth Circuit, these provisions were "direct
commands to the states to regulate according to Congress'
instructions."144
At least in the sense that shall is a command, the Ninth
Circuit was certainly correct. Whether the provisions are commands
"to regulate," though, is a more complicated question. If New York v.
United States rests, as I have suggested, on a distinction between
regulation of the states and commands to the states that they regu-
late their citizens, it is unclear that the provisions are "regulations."
Here, third parties are not directly implicated by the federal statute,
as they were in New York v. United States.
Suppose, for example, the state's governor issues regulations
directing that its forester require timber purchasers to certify that
they will not export the timber. Some purchaser might object to this
regulatory imposition. Would the purchaser blame the state forester,
or the governor, or Congress? The purchaser might ask, 'WVhy do I
have to?" The forester would reply, "Because those damned feds make
me ask.' 145 I doubt that political responsibility would be seriously dif-
fused by the statutory provisions that the Ninth Circuit held uncon-
stitutional.
Alternatively, the national government could argue plausibly
that Congress was acting on the states in their proprietary capacities,
as owners and sellers of timber, and that regulation of states as own-
ers and sellers does not implicate the basic federalism concerns about
which Justice O'Connor wrote. Of course, the state would reply that
it sold the timber as a fiduciary for its citizens, the proceeds being
used-as required by the 1889 statute admitting the state of
Washington to the union-to support the state's schools and universi-
ties. If we see the timber in that way, the federal statute regulates a
governmental rather than a proprietary activity. This sort of problem
is precisely why the Court found the "governmental/proprietary" dis-
tinction untenable. A third possibility is to note that Congress did not
single out the states for regulation; it banned export of timber from
federally owned lands as well.
Finally, Prakash's theory suggests the possibility that the
statute was constitutional because the congressional directive ran to
144. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d at 947.
145. An astute forester would have a disclaimer-'THIS CERTIFICATE REQUIRED BY
FEDERAL LAW"--prominently printed on the form.
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the Governor rather than to the state legislature. At the very least,
however, this seems unduly formalistic: Whatever concerns one
might have about federalism seem equally applicable to such a direc-
tive as they would if Congress had directed the state legislature to
adopt the regulations itself. Perhaps the distinction, then, is not be-
tween state legislatures and state executives, but between those who,
under local law, have final lawmaking authority over the relevant
subject, and those who take the law given to them and administer
it.146 Where, as is inevitably true, a governor's actions, even those
taken in her lawmaking capacity, are subject to displacement by state
legislatures, this will unlikely be a comfortable rule for courts to ad-
minister.
None of this is to say that the Ninth Circuit was "wrong" in its
application of New York v. United States. Rather, it is to illustrate
the points at which Justice O'Connor's standard might buckle under
pressure. I suspect that the outcome in the timber case turns on
whether the judges think that Congress has simply "gone too far" in
trying to protect the nation's timberlands, an interest that the judges
themselves may see as less pressing than Congress apparently did.
That is, the application of New York v. United States turns on an un-
stated functional or balancing test. The experience under National
League of Cities suggests that such tests will turn out to be failures.
4. Defining State Autonomy
Professor Merritt's proposal requires the courts to define what
attributes of state governments make them autonomous. Particularly
because she rests her proposal on the "republican form of govern-
ment" clause,147 which has received essentially no judicial exposition,
it is hard to know how courts would develop the proposal.
Congress amended the Forest Resources Conservation Act in
response to the Ninth Circuit's decision. Instead of requiring the
state to develop regulations, Congress authorized the Secretary of
Commerce to exempt states from the federal rules if the state's gover-
nor "submit[s] a program. . . for approval" that
implements, with respect to unprocessed timber originating from public lands
in that State, the prohibition on exports . . and ensures that the species,
146. Compare with City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (holding that
municipal liability under § 1983 arises only for actions taken by officials with "policymaking
authority").
147. See Merritt, 47 Vand. L. Rev. at 1580-81 (cited in note 111).
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grades, and geographic origin of unprocessed timber prohibited from export
within the State is representative of the species, grades, and geographic origin
of timber comprising the total timber sales program of the State.148
Because this provision gives the states the choice between
presenting a plan for approval and submitting to preemptive federal
regulation, on Professor Merritt's view it appropriately preserves
state autonomy. Again, however, I wonder whether the residents of
Washington state see the "choice" as something that preserves their
state's autonomy or rather as something that further symbolizes the
submission of their government to the national one.
C. Criticisms of Potential Doctrinal Developments
In describing these post-New York doctrinal tensions, I have
already begun to sketch the reasons for my skepticism about their
stability. Historical experience has shown, for example, that pure
federalism limits on congressional power are unlikely to provide satis-
factory solutions to the problem of accommodating state authority and
national power to the extent that devising such an accommodation is
seen as a problem suitable for judicial solution. Similarly, experience
shows that attempts to distinguish among congressional powers tend
to generate quite unstable lines. Until the Fifth Circuit decision on
the Eleventh Amendment and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, for
example, it would have been quite odd to suggest that Congress had
less power under the Indian Commerce Clause than under the
Interstate Commerce Clause. What now about Congress' power under
the Foreign Commerce Clause? And, are the implications of the
distinction different where federalism/Tenth Amendment restrictions
are involved than where the Eleventh Amendment is involved?
Exploring these questions and the related ones that would inevitably
arise under either the "pure federalism limits" or "distinctions among
powers" approaches is, again, unlikely to provide much enlightenment
about federalism or the Constitution.
The difficulties with the proposals by Prakash and Merritt are
both less and more serious. They are less serious because, as aca-
demic proposals, they have been worked out in some detail and with
an academic's attention to their implications. They are more serious,
148. Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Amendments Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-45, § 2, 107 Stat. 223 (July 1, 1993), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 620 et seq. (Supp. 1993).
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however, precisely because they are academic proposals.149 That is,
they draw lines and make distinctions that are quite unlikely to ap-
peal to the judges who make constitutional law.150 People have found
federalism attractive in the past because it allows states a domain
within which they are free to choose whatever policies their citizens
like. Yet, neither of the academic proposals is closely tied to that rea-
son for finding federalism attractive.
Professor Merritt's acknowledgement that Congress can ac-
complish whatever substantive goals it wishes so long as it acts di-
rectly, for example, is likely to leave judges wondering about exactly
what they are accomplishing in exercising what most judges are likely
to regard as the important power of judicial review: certainly not any
actual alteration of the potential power of Congress and the states;
perhaps a shift in the bargaining positions within Congress; perhaps,
as Professor Merritt suggests, some prophylactic effect with respect to
policies someone might propose in the future. This is not a great deal.
In theory, then, New York v. United States might be the basis
for doctrinal development. In practice, however, it is unlikely to pro-
duce a stable body of law. It is unlikely, that is, to be the foundation
of a useful constitutional law of federalism. And, in the end, that is
exactly why the Supreme Court overruled National League of Cities.
IV. CONCLUSION
After a decade, Philip Bobbitt's observation about National
League of Cities remains the most astute in the critical commen-
tary. 51 For Bobbitt, the Court there did not truly articulate a legal
doctrine that we should expect to be applied in a range of cases over
succeeding years. Rather, the Court was exercising a "cueing func-
tion," reminding Congress that it ought to "renew its traditional role
as protector of the states."152 Yet, as Bobbitt recognizes, the Court did
149. In this they are reminiscent of nothing as much as the efforts by Professors Tribe and
Michelman to make sense out of National League of Cities. See Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1977); Frank Michehuan, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L. J. 1165 (1977).
150. This is perhaps most apparent in Prakash's treatment of congressional commandeer-
ing of the state judiciary, which, he argues, is constitutionally permissible but only if Congress
imposes judicial duties on only those state judges who have been appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. Prakash, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 1032 (cited in note 92).
151. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 191-95 (Oxford U.,
1982).
152. Id. at 194.
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not say, and I believe never has said, that some of its invalidations of
congressional acts are exercises of this peculiar function. Rather, the
Court presents its decisions as merely an exercise of its ordinary pow-
ers of judicial review.
One might dispute the contention that Congress needed such a
reminder when National League of Cities or New York v. United
States was decided. The real difficulty with "cueing" decisions,
though, is that readers outside Congress, including lawyers for state
governments and lower court judges, will take the decisions to be or-
dinary exercises of judicial review, articulating doctrines that should
be applied consistently to problems sufficiently analogous to the ones
in New York v. United States and other "cueing" decisions. After they
do, the Supreme Court, having presented the initial decision as ordi-
nary judicial review, will be unable to say that these readers have
misunderstood the point of the Court's action. Instead, the Court will
have to explain why these readers misinterpreted the precedent.
Perhaps it will distinguish the "motor voter" case from New York v.
United States, for example, by noting that Congress was acting to en-
force the Reconstruction amendments. As these explanations accu-
mulate, the notion that New York v. United States articulates a con-
stitutional doctrine will dissipate. Eventually, the decision will be-
come a relic.
One route to that end might be the following: The precise con-
tours of health care reform legislation are yet to be defined, but I am
reasonably confident that somewhere embedded in whatever Congress
adopts will be provisions that are vulnerable under New York v.
United States. For example, at least some versions of the suggested
state oversight agencies are likely to be federal commands to state
governments with respect to regulation of private individuals: These
agencies, some proposals indicate, will define insurance packages,
prescribe reimbursement rates, and otherwise regulate the provision
of health care.
Because we do not know what provisions will be vulnerable, I
do not raise the health care reform proposals to show that New York
v. United States has clear implications for those proposals. Instead, I
use the example to deepen the points previously made. In New York
v. United States, the Court held unconstitutional a provision, not yet
in force, that was the last step in Congress' effort to deal with the se-
rious problem of how to dispose of low-level nuclear wastes. Yet, no
matter how important the problem is, I doubt that the public gener-
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ally, or even a substantial segment of the interest group community,
was truly upset by the decision. 153 The "motor voter" statute and
health care reform are, I believe, different. If the courts were to in-
validate significant provisions of those statutes, adverse public reac-
tion would be substantial. And, precisely for that reason, the courts
will be inclined to develop ways to explain why the provisions are not
unconstitutional under New York v. United States. The Court may
muddle through the process, using New York v. United States as the
starting point for its analysis, just as in the years after National
League of Cities that decision was the starting point for analyses that
regularly upheld what Congress had done. As Justice Blackmun ex-
plained in Garcia, on the doctrinal level that is why the Court over-
ruled National League of Cities; as the cases arose, the Supreme
Court found it impossible to apply the National League of Cities doc-
trine consistently, impossible to invalidate legislation that the justices
thought more important than the Fair Labor Standards Act.
By invoking a criterion of "public importance," I am of course
alluding to broader issues.M  In the present context, I think it worth
noting that the forces that drove the Supreme Court to abandon its
pre-New Deal effort to limit congressional power in the name of fed-
eralism-that is, the nationalization of the economy-have become
even more potent. The globalization of the economy is surely more
important in determining what happens in the lives of residents of
the United States than the intricacies of federalism doctrine. And, if
that is so, I wonder why we constitutional scholars spend our time
working over one admittedly interesting Supreme Court opinion
rather than devoting time to thinking about what it would mean to
have a constitutional democracy in a global economy.
Some years from now, New York v. United States might for-
mally survive, unreversed by the Supreme Court. If so, it will not be
the foundation of a revitalized constitutional federalism.155 At most it
will be a reminder of the federalism that we used to have, but have no
153. The relative lack of academic commentary on New York v. United States is, I think,
suggestive.
154. On one level, for example, my argument could be taken simply as an illustration,
worked out in doctrinal detail, of the proposition that law is ultimately politics. On that level,
there would be nothing particularly distinctive about the doctrinal difficulties I have been con-
cerned with in this Article; they would attend any effort to develop a coherent, "nonpolitical"
constitutional law about any subject.
155. As a canon of statutory interpretation, the rule in Gregory v. Ashcroft may survive,
and have some significant effects on bargaining within Congress. Whether federalism-based
rules of statutory construction should be regarded as aspects of constitutional federalism raises
interesting questions about the scope of "constitutional law" which I cannot explore here.
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longer. Neither the decision, nor constitutional federalism itself, will
be important components in the operation of the government under
which we live.

